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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
~rr1\TE OF UTAH, 
Plain.tiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
IJ~\ WRENCE ALBERT HORNE, 
Defendant and Appella.nt. 
Case 
No. 9380 
BRIEF OF RESP·O·NDENT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent makes the following statement of 
facts, and adopts the appellant's nomenclature for desig-
nating the citations to the record. 
The prosecutrix, Shirley Pies, 1s a 20-year-old 
mother of t'Yo minor children (T. 7) who resided ""ith 
her children, ages ~ and 3 ( T. 8) in a house trailer lo-
cated in Hammond's Trailer Court, Clearfield, Utah. At 
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the time of the incident her husband, a serviceman, was 
overseas in the Philippine Islands. 
On the night of June 14, 1960, at about 10 :30 p.m., 
Mrs. Pies went to bed in her house trailer, placing her 
two-year-old daughter in bed with her, and her three-
year-old son in another bedroom adjacent to her. (T. 8) 
Since the night was warm, she left the doors to the trailer 
open. At some time after midnight she was awakened 
by the defendant ringing her doorbell. The defendant 
entered the trailer without being invited. (T. 9) The 
trailer was not lighted, but the defendant had been in 
the trailer with his girl friend, also an acquaintance of 
the prosecutrix, the night before. The defendant had 
met the prosecutrix prior to the 14th of June, and had 
visited at the trailer before. ( T. 17) Upon entering the 
trailer the defendant opened the refrigerator, and asked 
the prosecutrix if she had any ''coke.'' She replied she did 
not, and then indicated that Bonnie Lee, the defendant's 
girlfriend, was not in the trailer. (R. 10) The defendant 
indicated he came for the prosecutrix, not Bonnie Lee. 
He entered the bedroom, took off his pants, and announced 
his intention to make love to :1fr~. Pies. Defendant pro-
ceeded to climb on the bed \Yhere ~irs. Pies and her child 
were in an attempt to haYe intercourse \Yith her. ~Irs. 
Pies' testimony makes it clear that she struggled and 
resisted for some time to deter the defendant from rap-
ing her. (T. 11) She testified: 
''A. My little girl was at the head of the bed, on 
the right of me. l\fy little boy "~as asleep in 
the other bedroom. 
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Q. Will you relatP the events then, after he 
came to the bed, 1\tf rs. Pies'? As you best re-
member them? 
.A.. l-Ie kept trying to put his hands on me, and 
kept trying to put his mouth on me. And I 
kPpt pushing him a\vay, and struggling \vith 
him. ~[y little girl woke up and she started to 
cr~~, and she kept saying she wanted a drink 
of \Vater, and finally I told Larry: 'Please, I 
have got to go to the bathroom.' I thought 
if I got to the bathroom that he'd think I had 
locked the door and he'd leave, but there 
wasn't a lock on the bathroom door. 
I was in the bathroom about 10 or 15 minutes, 
and he kept telling me to come out, and I told 
him I wasn't going to, and then he opened the 
bathroom door. He found out it wasn't locked, 
and he came to the bathroom door and opened 
it, and he pulled me out of the bathroom and 
into the bedroom. 
Q. What happened after you were taken back 
to the bedroom? 
A. Well, we struggled for quite a while more, 
and Larry kept throwing me on the bed, and 
I "~ould manage to get away from him, and 
then he \vould pull me back, and I couldn't 
get a'vay from him. 
Q. Was anything happening to your clothing dur-
ing this time, ~Irs. Pies u? 
.A... Oh, he pulled my slip do\vn, do,vn to my waist, 
and he tried to take my pants off, and I had 
ahold of my pants with one hand, and he 
pulled them off of me. I couldn't hold them up. 
Q. ..A.nd after he had your pants off, \Yhat hap-
pened then·? 
.A.. Then he thre"~ me back on the bed. And I \vas 
so tired, and my little girl kept crying for a 
3 
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drink of water, aud at one tiu~e my head hit 
her in the stomach, and I said: 'Stop it. You're 
hurting my little girl,' and he said: 'I'm not 
hurting you. If you'd quit fighting me,' he 
said, 'then none of this would happen.' 
Q. Did you continue to struggle 1 
A. Yes, I did. I begged him to let me go, and 
he wouldn't. He wouldn't leave me alone. 
Q. What happened after that, Mrs. Pies' 
A. Well, after this he got me on the bed, and I 
don't know exactly how he got me pinned me 
down. I couldn't move, but anyway I kept try-
ing to push him off, and I pulled his hair and 
I hit him, and it didn't do any good. He acted 
like he didn't feel anything. And then he had 
intercourse with me.'' 
Later she also testified. ( T. 16). 
'' Q. Will you tell the jury, please, how you know 
that he had intercourse 'vith you? 
A. I know because he had ahold of both my arms 
with his hands, and he " .. as laying on top of 
me, and I tried to prevent it. I tried to squeeze 
my legs together, and that didn't do any good. 
He got his knee between my legs, and pushed 
my legs apart.'' (Emphasis supplied) 
In addition, she testified that the defendant pulled off the 
pair of panties she was wearing. (T. 11} These were 
introduced in evidence as part of Exhibit A. The elastic 
band on the panties was torn and stretched, and Mrs. Pies 
testified this resulted from the struggle 'vith the de-
fendant. 
On cross-examination, and in defendant's brief, much 
was said about the door to the trailer being open so that 
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prosecutrix could have escaped at the time of going into 
the bathroom. This was still early in the encounter, and 
i\[ rs. Pies testified : 
"Q. Now isn't it true that, when you walked out of 
the bedroom, you could have gone out this 
door or out this door? 
..:\. I U'asn 'f going to leave my two children in the 
house U'ith him there." (Emphasis supplied) 
Immediately after the act she was scared and confused 
( T. 31), and consulted a doctor. 
'r ery shortly after the incident, only some two hours 
later, in a condition that indicated to her friends that 
she was upset (T. 37), she complained of the defendant's 
assault upon her to a Mrs. Thelma Babcock, a close friend. 
(T. 37) Mrs. Babcock testified without objection that 
Mrs. Pies claimed she had been ''raped.'' 
The defendant testified that he lived a few hun-
dred yards from the prosecutrix's trailer, and that on 
the night of June 14, 1960, he went to Mrs Pies' trailer, 
rang the doorbell and entered (T. 66) He went back into 
the bedroom where the prosecutrix and her child were. 
He admitted making advances to her, and admitted that 
she objected. (T. 67) He then claims they engaged in 
necking until ~Irs. Pies went to the bathroom. He admits 
going to the bathroom to see what was taking her so long 
and taking her back to the bedroom. (T. 68) He claims 
they then had intercourse and he left. ( T. 69) On cross-
examination the defendant admitted again that the prose-
cutrix denied his adYances. ( T. 71) 
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No evidence was introduced showing the prosecutrix 
was a woman untrue to her husband or of easy virtue, 
although the defendant's girl friend, Bonnie Lee, testi-
fied that the community opinion as to l\Irs. Pies for her 
chastity was not very good. ( T. 57) 
Based upon the above evidence the jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of rape against the defendant, and the 
trial judge that conducted the trial denied a motion for 
new trial. The defendant has appealed, assigning various 
errors. Examination of the appellant's claim of irregu-
larities reveals that they are totally without merit. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
PoiNT I. 
THE TESTIMONY OF THELMA BABCOCK 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, AND NO 
ERROR AROSE THEREFRO~I. 
PoiNT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE EXTENT OF RESISTANCE 
NECESSARY BY .A. FEMALE TO CONSTI-
TUTE NON-CONSENT TO THE OFFENSE 
OF RAPE. 
PoiNT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING ON THE ELEMENT OF PENETRATION 
IN THE CRIME OF RAPE. 
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PoiNT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE JURY'S FINDING. 
PoiNT V. 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
ARGUMENT 
PoiNT I. 
THE TESTI:\lONY OF THELMA BABCOCK 
WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED, AND NO 
ERROR AROSE THEREFROM. 
The defendant contends that the court erred in re-
ceiving the testimony of Thelma Babcock. She testified 
that at approximately 6 :30 o'clock on the morning of the 
15th of June, 1960, the prosecutrix came to her house in 
an upset condition (T. 36, 37), and upon inquiry from 
~Irs. Babcock, she stated, ''Thelma, I'm in terrible 
trouble. Larry Horne entered my trailer last night 
and raped me.'' 
No objection \\'"as made to the inquiry by counsel for 
the defendant, although the question the prosecutor asked 
w·as to state generally \\'"hat the prosecutrix had said. 
Counsel for the defendant thereafter did not make a mo-
tion to strike, nor ask the court to instruct the jury sua 
sponte to disregard the statements. Counsel thereafter 
accepted the witness for cross-examination. Defendant 
did not set out the claimed error as a basis for his motion 
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for new trial. The failure to make timely objection waives 
the hearsay defect, if any there be, and renders the re-
ceipted evidence competent. In White v. Newman, 10 Utah 
2d 62, 348 P. 2d 343 ( 1960), the present court ruled that 
'' unassailed hearsay evidence'' is competent evidence. 
The defendant having failed to make timely objection 
must be deemed to have waived any defect in the evidence. 
Moore v. United States, 56 F. 2d 764 (lOth Cir.); State v. 
Karvelos, 80 N.H. 528, 120 A. 263; Abbott, Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 351. 
The defendant relies upon People v. Holmes, 292 
Mich. 212, 290 N.W. 384 (1940) in contending that the 
failure to object was not a waiver. That case is not ap-
plicable in the present situation since the court there 
said: 
''It is axiomatic that an objection not properly 
and timely presented to the Court below will be 
ignored on review and, except under unusual cir-
cumstances we have no disposition to relax this 
rule." (Emphasis supplied) 
The facts of the Holmes case show an attempt by 
the prosecutor on cross-examination to prove similar acts 
of the accused, not the subject of the instant charge. This 
was the same action that was disapproved in State v. 
Dickson, 11 Utah 2d ------, 361 P. 2d 412 ( 1961), which is 
clearly absent here. In addition, the counsel in the Holmes 
case filed an affidavit alleging inopportunity to object 
because of the defendant's age and eagerness, a factor 
also not present here. The courts have generally said 
the failure to object will only be overlooked in face of 
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obvious prejudice and fundamental unfairness. 4 C.J.S., 
Appeal and Error, Sec. 245; People v. Dean, 308 Ill. 74, 
139 N.E. 37; People v. Holmes, supra, p. 385, N.W. Re-
porter. In the instant case the area of inquiry was highly 
relevant to the matter of corroboration; the prosecutor 
and the court had just previously cautioned the witness 
to speak slowly; and the matter receipted was not addi-
tional, immaterial, prejudicial matter, but evidence cor-
roborating what had just been related by the prosecutrix. 
In addition, the defense was thoroughly apprised before-
hand of what Thelma Babcock's testimony would be since 
the prosecutor clearly indicated such in his opening 
statement. (T. 4) For these reasons the failure to object 
must waive any claimed defect, People v. Porter, 123 Cal. 
A pp. 618, 11 P. 2d 894. 
It is submitted that the evidence as presented was 
admissible and proper. There is no dispute as to the rule 
of law applicable to fresh complaint declarations. Gener-
ally complaints by the victim of rape made within a 
reasonable time after the offense are admissible as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. Abbott, Criminal Trial 
Practice, 4th Ed., Sec. 552. The rule has been applied in 
Utah as stated in State v Christensen., 73 Utah 575, 276 
P. 163 (1929) : 
''The rule is well settled in this jurisdiction that, 
in a prosecution for rape, testimony may be given 
that the prosecutrix recently after the alleged act 
complained of the outrage, to whom the complaint 
was made, and where and when the crime was 
committed, but that the details or particulars of 
the complaint may not be given.'' 
9 
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The Utah rule has been further defined in State v. 
Martinez, 7 U. 2d 387, 326 P. 2d 102 (1958), so as not to 
limit it to an abstract proposition, but rather to state a 
rule commensurate with the obvious expressions of per-
sons complaining of the commission of rape. There the 
Court stated, p. 390 Utah Reports: 
''We believe the conversation of the prosecutrix 
with a friend within hours after she had arrived 
home, as related by such friend, "'"as so lacking in 
details that its admission did not violate the rule 
heretofore enunciated by this court to the effect 
that where a woman allegedly has been unlawfully 
violated sexually, any statement made by her 
within a reasonably short time thereafter, is ad-
missible if, without recitation of the details, it 
refers to the commission of the offense, such state-
ment being a spontaneous utterance whose very 
spontaneity together with a characteristic, nat-
ural feminine inclination to express an outraged 
feeling under such circumstances, guarantees its 
trustworthiness.'' 
Thus the Martinez case recognized that the complaint 
is not a sterile declaration, but rather ofttimes contains 
identifying and factual matter. An analysis of the re-
spondent's brief in the Martinez case (Brief 8796, Re-
spondent, p. 17, 18, 19), shows the Yery close similarity 
between the report in the instant case and that accepted 
by the Court in Martinez. Under the circumstances the 
declaration to Thelma Babcock 'Yas merely the natural 
expression of complaint, and not the detailed recitation 
of the event. 
The defendant also complains it was improper to 
allow Thelma Babcock to state the complaint of the prose-
10 
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eutrix because the eomplaint named the defendant as the 
assailant. Reliance is placed upon State v. Christensen, 
supra, where the Court stated it is not generally com-
petent to give testimony of the name of the person who 
committed thP outrage It is doubtful whether in view of 
the more practical rule laid down in State v. Martinez, 
supra, if this is still the law, but even so the Court went 
on to express itself beyond the rule quoted in defendant's 
brief, and in so doing laid to rest any possible claim to 
prejudice the defendant here may have. The Court said: 
''Generally, it is not competent to give testimony 
as to the name of the person or who it was that 
committed the outrage upon her; but, under the 
circumstances, the statement the prosecutrix made, 
that the defendant 'had had sexual intercourse 
\vith her,' if not competent to be given, was harm-
less, in view that the defendant by his testimony 
admitted all of the facts and circumstances as re-
lated by the prosecutrix, except the force and vio-
lence, that he was the person with the prosecutrix, 
and had sexual intercourse with her. * * * '' 
Since in the instant case no issue of identity or presence 
existed, the facts are \vithin the quoted exception making 
the recitation harmless. 
Based upon the above authorities, it is submitted that 
the defendant's claim of error as to the admission of Mrs. 
Babcock's testimony is significantly without merit. State 
v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 123, 63 P. 2d 584. 
PorNT II. 
THE COURT PROPERLY IKSTRUCTED THE 
JURY OX THE EXTENT OF RESISTANCE 
11 
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NECESSARY BY A FEMALE TO CONST~ 
TUTE NON-CONSENT TO THE OFFENSE 
OF RAPE. 
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in 
instructing the jury relative to. the amount of resistance 
a female must use to frustrate her attacker. The instruc-
tion given must be looked upon as a whole to determine 
whether it adequately appraised the jury as to the re-
quired standard, and in making an appraisal isolated 
statements and paragraphs should not be singled out 
for individual consideration. State v. Sweetin, 134 Kan. 
663, 8 P. 2d 397; People v. Semone, 140 Cal. App. 318,35 P. 
2d 379; Abbott, supra, Sec. 669. 
In the instant case the Court's instruction on the 
charge of rape was more than adequate to properly 
apprise the jury of the applicable law. (R. 13) The jury 
was clearly instructed that the crime must be committed 
"against the resistance of the female," and that "proof 
of resistance'' was necessary. The Court further in-
structed that the "nature and extent of the resistance" 
must ''depend upon the surrounding circumstances.'' In 
addition, the ''conduct of the female'' must be such as to 
"make non-consent and actual resistOJn.ce" manifest in 
accordance with all the surrounding circumstances, and 
until further resistance is "useless.'' At the outset it 
should be noted that this instruction is similar to those 
given and approved in other jurisdictions. Ried's Bran-
son Instructions to Juries, 3rd Ed., Vol. 5 (1960 Supp.), 
Sec. 4098; Specifically see People v. Nazworth, 152 Cal. 
App. 2d 790, 313 P. 2d 113. The required standard now 
12 
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generally accepted by most courts is one of reasonable 
resistance under the circumstances and not the standard 
upmost resistance. 1960 Annual Survey American Law, 
p. 114; Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1, 
Sec. 308. 
The most obvious reasons for taking a less stringent 
attitude is the recognition of the fact that resistance to 
the upmost may often produce serious or severe injury 
and commonly death, and that to require such a standard 
of resistance is often contrary to the female's actions 
where it may appear that under the circumstances her 
non-consent was manifest and the practicalities and the 
safety of the situation demanded less than the upmost 
resistance. Discretion may be the better part of valor 
under such situations. 
The Utah cases clearly support the more modern and 
better reasoned trend, and do not require the upmost 
resistance from the female. As was said in State v. Rob-
erts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. 2d 584: 
''In certain decisions the courts have stated broad-
ly that the State must show that the female 
resisted to her uttermost capacity to prevent pene-
tration in order to show that there was no con-
sent, and that the act was forcibly done. We think 
such a rule is too strict and that the trend of the 
more modern decisions is not to require such a 
showing. * * * '' 
Subsequently the Utah Supreme Court reiterated 
its stand against the ''uttermost resistance'' theory in 
State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397 (1949), and 
13 
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recognized the rule as such in State v. Ward, 10 U. 2d 
34, 38 (1959) .1 
In State v. Beeny, supra, an instruction only similar 
in part to that given here was presented to the jury. The 
difference is that the first sentence of the instruction in 
the Beeny case, which was was aspect that the Court there 
found objectionable, was not given. Instead, here, it was 
clearly made manifest that the degree of resistance must 
depend upon the circumstances, and the woman's ability 
to resist ; and that "actual resistance'' must be reason-
ably manifest. A much more complete instruction was 
given in the instant case. This being so, the objections 
found in the Beeny case are not present here. Even so, in 
the B eeny case the Court did not find the instruction 
itself to be error, but stated: 
"We are of the opinion that the instruction given 
would leave less uncertainty as to the resistance 
contemplated by law, with the sentence omitted. 
By so stating, however, we do not wish to be under-
stood as holding that its inclusion was in itself 
prejudicial error.'' 
The ratio decidendi of the Beeny case was to the ef-
fect that where the jury manifests confusion from an 
instruction, the Court must instruct in such a manner as 
to clear the confusion. In the instant case the record re-
flects none of the confusion manifest in Beeny. Also, it 
should be noted that in addition to the appraisal that 
1 Reliance by appellant upon State v. McCune 16 U 170 51 P. 
818, is misplaced since the rule was chanaed ht Stat~ v Roberts 
supra. S_tate v. Wittingh_ill, _109 Utah 48, i63 P. 2d 342 (1945), i~ 
not applicable to the principle for which it is cited and has no 
bearing on the present issue. ' 
14 
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force was necessary in the Instruction complained of, the 
Court instructed in Instructions 5, 7 and 10 ( R. 12, 15) 
that it was necessary to use force, and to overcome the 
prosecutrix's resistance. This clearly gave the jury the 
correct standard by which to weigh the evidence 
The Instruction given was in keeping with the la\v 
of this jurisdiction, and similar to the rules of law 
applicable in other jurisdictions. It was a correct state-
ment of the required standard of resistance. See Whar-
ton's, Criminal Law and Procedure, Vol. 1, Sec. 308. 
When looking at the totality of the instructions given, it 
cannot be maintained that the jury was mislead nor 
that the Court committed error in its charge to the jury. 
Appellant's claim on this point is without substance. 
PoiNT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN INSTRUCT-
ING ON THE ELEMENT OF PENETRATION 
IN THE CRIME OF RAPE. 
The appellant contends that the Court erred in in-
structing the jury that ''any sexual penetration, however 
slight, is sufficient to constitute the act of sexual inter-
course as that term is used with reference to the crime of 
rape." (R. 12) Appellant contends this 'vas prejudicial 
since the fact of intercourse was not in dispute. The basis 
of his claim is that the instruction is abstract, and con-
trary to the rule espoused in State v. Marasco, 81 l 1tah 
323, 17 P. 2d 919. That case dealt not with rape, but 
arson, did not concern itself 'vith the instant instruction, 
and finally the principle announced therein, "that it is 
erroneous to give instructions based on a state of facts 
15 
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which there is no evidence tending to prove'' is not 
applicable to the instant case since both prosecution and 
defense presented facts and evidence tending to prove 
the act of sexual intercourse The fact that the matter was 
not in dispute in no way lessens its presence before the 
jury. For this reason the instruction was not rendered 
in the abstract. 
The instruction given by the Court covered an essen-
tial element of the crime. The crime of rape requires ''an 
act of sexual intercourse.'' 76-53-15, U.C.A. 1953, and 
''any sexual penetration, however slight,'' "rhen present 
with other facts making out the elements of the crime is 
sufficient. 75-53-17, U.C.A. 1953. Penetration is required, 
and is therefore an essential element of the crime. People 
v. Griffin, 117 Cal. 583, 49 Pac. 711; People v. H award, 
143 Cal. 316, 76 Pac. 1116; State v. Depoister, 21 Nev. 
107, 25 Pac.1000; Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure, 
Vol. 1, Sec. 304. 
The act of sexual penetration being an essential ele-
ment was thus one which the j.ury had to find to convict 
the accused. The Court had a duty to instruct upon all 
.the essential elements that make up the crime charged. 
75 C.J.S., Rape, Sec. 82(a). In keeping writh that require-
ment the Court here charged the jury on the element of 
penetration. The fact that this was admitted was of no 
prejudice to the accused. It is the generally stated rule 
that: 
"Inn prosecution for rape, the Court must prop-
erly charge as to the necessity for penetra-
tion; * * *." 
(75 C.J.S., Rape, Sec. 82(b). 
16 
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The instruction given was in keeping with the above 
stated general mandate. The authorities that have con-
Hidered the possible prejudice from an instruction like 
that given by the Court, where sexual intercourse was 
a<lmitted, have concluded that no prejudice results. Ter-
ritory v. Edie, 20 Pac. 851, 6 N.M. 555; 75 C.J.S., Rape, 
Sec. 82(b). 
It is not necessary to go beyond the decisions of the 
Utah Supreme Court to resolve the issue against the de-
fendant. In State v. Beeny, 115 Utah 168, 203 P. 2d 397 
( 1949), a similar contention was raised. There the de-
fendant admitted intercourse with the prosecutrix and 
the Court instructed on the issue of sexual intercourse. 
The Supreme Court stated that although the act of inter-
course was admitted, it was not prejudicial to instruct on 
the matter. The Court indicated that the only danger that 
might arise would be if the jury were to indicate confusion 
on the amount of force necessary to constitute rape. The 
Supreme Court held no error resulted, stating: 
"Under the evidence, elements one and two were 
not in dispute. * * * Nevertheless, error cannot 
be predicated upon including elements one and two 
in the charge.'' 
The only dispute involved in the present case was 
the issue of force and resistance. On this issue the jury 
was clearly instructed, and no confusion of the jury 
appears of record, in any of the juror's minds as to the 
issue at stake, nor does the appellant contend any existed. 
The aspect of penetration being an essential element of 
the offense, no error can be claimed from instructing 
17 
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thereon. Appellant's claim of error on this point is not 
established. 
PoiNT IV. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUS-
TAIN THE JURY'S FINDING. 
The appellant contends that this Court should re· 
verse the lower court's verdict because the evidence is 
insufficient to sustain the conviction. In support of his 
argument he contends that the testimony of the prosecu-
trix is inherently improbable and contradictory, and thus 
requires corroboration, and that the record does not con-
tain sufficient corroborative evidence. 
Before proceeding to examine the contention, it is 
well to review the position of appellate courts on the 
extent to 'Yhich they will intrude into a ju.ry verdict in a 
criminal case. The issue of the guilt or innocence of an 
accused is primarily for the jury. In State v. Green, 78 
Utah 580,6 P. 2d 177 and State v. Harris, 1 U. 2d 182,264 
P. 2d 284 (1953), it was said: 
"It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the facts in all criminal cases, 
whether the evidence offered by the state is 
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not contro-
verted * * * '' 
This being the status of the jury in a criminal trial, the 
verdict will not be easily set aside. Based upon the func-
tion of the jury, the C~ourt has previously said: 
''With respect * * * [to] the scope of review 
* * * '"f tl "d f 1 1e ev1 ence avorable to the state 'Yith 
all reasonable inferences and intendments th~t can 
18 
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be drawn therefrom, could sustain a verdict of 
guilty the cause should be submitted to the jury.'' 
Thus the Court has said with reference to its power of 
reversal: 
''We reverse a jury verdict only where we con-
clude from a consideration of all of the evidence 
and the inferences therefrom viewed in the light 
most fa,vorable to such verdict that the findings are 
unreasonable." State v. Berchtold, 11 U. 2d 208, 
357 P. 2d 183 ( 1960). (Emphasis supplied) 
::\[ost recently in a rape case, State v. Ward, supra, the 
Utah Court said : 
''The rules governing the scope of review on a p-
peal as to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain 
the verdict are well settled: that it is the preroga-
tive of the jury to judge the credibility of the wit-
nesses and to determine the facts; that the evi-
dence will be reviewed in the light most favorable 
to the verdict; and that if when so viewed it ap-
pears that the jury acting fairly and reasonably 
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt, the verdict will not be disturbed. * * * '' 
Only if the evidence, reviewed in a light most favorable to 
the State, could be said to be so unreasonable and im-
probable that no reasonable jury could have found the 
accused guilty, can the Court entertain a claim for re-
versal. To the degree that the facts supporting the con-
viction in the instant case are reasonable and not im-
probable, the appellate tribunal should affirm . 
..:\.s to the issue of the necessity for corroboration of 
the testimony of a prosecutrix, the rule is clear that cor-
roboration is not necessarily a requirement. As was 
19 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
stated in State v. Mills, 122 Utah 306, 249 P. 2d 211 
(1952): 
''There is without doubt wisdom in recognizing 
the danger of conviction of a sex crime upon the 
uncorroborated testimony of the prosecutrix and 
of viewing the same with caution as suggested in 
Morris v. State, supra. Yet if the law did not per-
mit conviction on such testimony, the guilty would 
often go unpunished. Seldom are such deeds per-
petrated in the presence of others. Where there is 
nothing inherently unreasonable or improbable in 
her testimony, it alone may support a conviction 
if the jury finds guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'' 
In State v. Diamond, 50 Nev. 433, 264 Pac. 687, it 'vas 
said: 
''There is no rule requiring the testimony of a 
prosecutrix in a rape case to be corroborated. It 
is sufficient, standing alone, to sustain a con-
viction.'' 
Unless the testimony of the prosecutrix is inherently 
improbable, it requires no corroboration. State v. Hillard, 
______ Ariz. ______ , 359 P. 2d 66 ( 1961). 
It is submitted that on the question of sufficiency of 
evidence, the defendant has erred in three particulars. 
(1) He has not appraised the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the verdict; (2) He has found supposed im-
probabilities in the testimony of the prosecutrix by 
accepting the defendant's testimony where conflict exists; 
(3) He has failed to note that the record does corroborate 
the testimony of the prosecutrix. 
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In the instant case the outrage of Mrs. Pies is not 
even remotely in dispute. She constailtly maintained that 
the resultant intercourse was over her objection. (T. 9, 10, 
11, 12). At no point in her testimony can any inference 
of consent be found. After the act she made it clear that 
she was outraged and expressly told the accused to ''get 
out'' and that she ''never wanted to see him again.'' 
(T. 13) This is corroborated by the testimony of the 
defendant, who claimed the act to be consentual, for 
he testified that the prosecutrix wanted him to leave. ( T. 
69) The first person the prosecutrix saw the next morn-
ing made it clear that Mrs. Pies was upset, and related 
a complaint of rape. ( T. 35) The prosecutrix testified 
that she fully resisted the advances of the accused. She 
made full and reasonable effort to deter his actions. There 
is nothing in Mrs. Pies' testimony that can be deemed 
inherently improbable or untruthful. 
It is contended that the prosecutrix could have 
effected her escape when she passed an open door on her 
\vay to the bathroom. It should be recalled that this was 
early in the encounter, and the defendant's actions had 
not reached the violent pitch to which they later rose. It 
certainly is not unreasonable to expect that a woman 
'vould reluctantly leave her home, and the action of pre-
tending to be locked in the bathroom is certainly believ-
able and foreseeable. Very possibly a delay might cause 
the attacker to cool off and think rationally. The most 
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reasonable explanation for Mrs. Pies' action was given 
by herself. (T. 23) : 
"Q. Now isn't it true that, when you walked out 
of the bedroom, you could have gone out this 
door or out this door~ 
A. I wasn't going to leave my two children in 
the house with him there." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
Indeed, the answer is more in keeping with any rational 
explanation than the argument made against it. Courts 
have long recognized that women may be willing to fore-
go their own safety because of a concern for their chil-
dren. Hallmark v. State, 22 Okla. Crim. 422, 212 Pac. 322 
(1923). In United States v. Daniels, 12 CMR 442 (1953), 
the Court clearly recognized the reasonableness of such 
action, saying: 
' ' * * * in view of the strong protective instincts 
of a mother for the life of her newborn child the 
mother may have been impelled by subjective fear 
to submit against her will to such acts even if such 
submission was more for the purposes of protect-
ing her child than for the purpose of saving her-
self. She is to be commended for her conduct in 
protecting her offspring and her conduct cannot be 
said to constitute that species of consent ''Thich 
will render the accused's acts guiltless.'' 
The prosecutrix had previously been concerned by 
the crying of her child, (T. 11) and after being dragged 
into the bedroom, still expressed concern for the safety 
of her little girl. (T. 12) Under these circumstances the 
conduct of the prosecutrix was "~holly reasonable and 
proper. No merit exists in any argument to the contrary. 
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The claim that the prosecutrix admitted any unfaith-
fulness or unchastity is a misstatement of the evidence. 
~Irs. Pies completely denied having any sexual relations 
with anyone other than her husband (T. 32, 33) and 
expressly denied the inference in the testimony of Bonnie 
Lee to such acts. (T. 76) The jury heard all the wit-
nesses and could believe whom they desired. It is not 
surprising they should choose not to believe Bonnie Lee, 
for her testimony appears biased even from the cold 
record, and she admitted being defendant's lover. (T. 58) 
The jury was free to appraise the demeanor of the wit-
nesses and believe whom they desired. Wigmore, Evi-
dence, 3rd Ed., Sec. 1395. Their conclusion was proper, 
and it cannot be said to be unreasonable. 
The defendant contends that the prosecutrix made no 
outcry, and delayed reporting the incident and, therefore, 
her story is so unbelievable as to require reversal. The 
defendant contends that the prosecutrix waited some 24 
hours later to report the incident. This is not so. If we 
assume the defendant's testimony to be true that he left 
at 4 :00-4 :30 in the morning, then the prosecutrix made 
her complaint to the first person she talked with only two 
hours later. (T. 35) At about 6:30 she entered the home 
of her friend, Thelma Babcock, who noticed that she was 
upset, and there she complained she had been ''raped.'' 
Thus the very first person she confronted she complained 
to. What more proper person to relate the truth to than 
a close friend and confidant' This was a fresh complaint, 
and as such \vas also corroboration of her testimony. 
\Vharton 's Criminal Evidence, 13th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 678. 
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The most logical reason for such evidence is that ''it in-
dicates the truth of the charge, and is corroborative 
thereof.'' Wharton, op. cit.; State v. Imlay, 22 Utah 156, 
61 Pac. 557 (1900). The close similarity between the 
corroborative declarations found proper in State v. Mar-
tinez and those present here should be noted. The fact 
that the police were not immediately informed is not so 
unreasonable, when it is noted that the victim made almost 
immediate complaint, and then went to the doctor. Many 
women are assaulted and do not report the matter at all 
because of the embarrassment and stigma associated with 
it. The desire to be free from disease or an unwanted 
child may weigh as heavily as the need to have the at-
tacker punished. The unfortunate position of the rape 
victim faced with the need to make disclosure and the 
humiliation connected therewith has been noted by Suth-
erland and Cressey in their excellent work, Principles of 
Criminology, 5th Ed., p. 21: 
''The loss of status in the community is frequently 
a result of crime The victim of rape, especially, 
suffers this loss, and the loss is immensely magni-
fied by the continued publicity given to it in the 
newspapers.'' 
The fact that a woman is reluctant to call police or 
friends and submit to the attack upon her character is 
not surprising. In this case, however, Mrs. Pies did com-
plain, and did subject herself to such harrassing, which 
certainly corroborates her story and indicates that ·w·hat 
she says happened actually took place. State v. Tr ard, 10 
U. 2d 34, 347 P. 2d 865 (1959). Courts have held delavs of 
ol 
the nature made here to be well within the bounds of 
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reason. DeSalvo v. People, 98 Colo. 368, 56 P. 2d 28 
(1936). Commowwealth v. Ellis, 319 Mass. 677, 67 N.E. 2d 
2R4; Commonwealth v. Krick, 164 Pa. Super 516, 67 A. 2d 
746; Lewis v. State, 226 S.W. 2d 861 (Tex. Cr. App.). 
Also for a similar complaint, People v. Ristau, 363 Ill. 
583, 2 N.E. 2d 833. In the instant case the complaint was 
timely under the circumstances, and the actions of the 
prosecutrix were not inconsistent with the guilt of the de-
fendant. In any event the ''truth of the charge'' is for 
the jury, Clark v. State, 28 Ala. App. 448, 186 So. 778. The 
prosecutrix made complaint shortly after the crime, 
sought medical assistance and then called the police, all 
reasonable actions. 
The defendant's assertion that the prosecutrix did 
nothing about being scantily clad is ignoring her testi-
mony to the contrary. The prosecutrix testified that she 
attempted to put on her peddle pushers, but that the de-
fendant prevented her. (T. 24) In addition she sought the 
refuge and sanctuary of the bathroom, all to no avail. 
The defendant apparently would require a showing 
of severe injury or the upmost resistance. Indeed, herein 
is where his cited authorities fail to support his con-
tention for they appear to support such a rule, whereas 
the Utah requirement is one of reasonableness under the 
circumstances. State v. Roberts, supra. The female need 
not show great wounds or bruises- "It is not necessary 
to show that a woman was butchered or brutally beaten to 
eorroborate her testimony of resistance to such an at-
tack." State v. Ward, supra. Indeed, in the instant case 
the circumstances show a struggle, and the torn and 
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stretched panties clearly corroborate the prosecutrix. If 
she were to lie about this, why not say all the holes in 
the clothing were the result of the struggle~ In the instant 
case the evidence, when viewed most favorable to the 
verdict, shows that the prosecutrix struggled until sub-
dued; that she attempted to evade the defendant and 
pleaded with him, both for herself and to stop ''hurting 
her little girl''; that her clothing was torn, that her most 
immediate neighbor and friend was in the hospital and 
no one appeared to whom she could make outcry, that 
the next morning she was upset and disturbed and made 
immediate complaint. All these factors, when viewed 
against the appellate requirements for sufficiency, 
strongly demonstrate the absence of merit in the defend-
ant's contentions. Cases less flagrant than the present 
one have been affirmed on appeal. MO!YIJn.ing v. State, 93 
So. 2d 716 (Fla.); Perry v. State, 80 N.W. 2d 699 (Neb.); 
.A.ndrews v. Sta.te, 289 S.W. 2d 262 (Tex.); People v. Fre-
mont, 47 Cal. App. 2d 341, 117 P. 2d 891; United States Y. 
Wright, 5 CMR 323. 
Based upon the evidence, it is submitted that the jury, 
acting within their province as finders of the fact, acted 
reasonably and based upon eYidence neither uncertain nor 
inherently improbable. The defendant's argument on the 
sufficiency of the evidence will not support reversal. 
PoiNT V. 
THE COtTRT PROPERLY DENIED THE DE-
FENDANT'S l\fOTION FOR .A. NEW TRIAL. 
The totality of the evidence and the record sho\\~s 
without question that the accused was afforded a fair 
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and adequate trial. The evidence is more than sufficient 
to sustain the conviction, and nowhere in the record can 
it be said that the cumulative effect of the trial was such 
as to compel a finding that it was not commensurate with 
due process of law. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319. 
CONCLUSION 
The jury found the appellant guilty after a fair and 
proper trial. They were adequately instructed on the 
law, the evidence, the presumption of innocence and re-
quirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. (T. 81). 
In addition, it must be remembered that the jury had the 
opportunity to view the witnesses, to contrast their size 
and strength, and to denote their demeanor.2 As was said 
by Justice Frank in Broadcast Music v. Havan.a Madrid 
Restwurant Corp., 175 F. 2d 77, 80 (2d Cir.): 
"* * * For the demeanor of an orally-testifying 
"~itness is 'always assumed to be in evidence.' It 
is 'wordless language.' The liar's story may seem 
uncontradicted to one who merely reads it, yet it 
may be 'contradicted' in the trial court by his 
manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures, 
and the like - all matters which 'cold print does 
not preserve' and 'vhich constitute 'list evidence' 
2 Many places in the record indicate that the defendant's demeanor 
and flipancy may have been a relevant factor. For example 
(T. 71): 
"Q. And you had intercourse with this girl, with her consent? 
A. The way she acted, yes. 
Q. And during all of this time you didn't once kiss her on 
mouth? 
A. No. 
Q. Doesn't that strike you as unusual? 
A. No. I'm not in love with her." 
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so far as an upper court is concerned. For such a 
court, it has been said, even if it were called a 're-
hearing court, ' is not a 'reseeing court. ' Only were 
we to have 'talking movies' of trials could it be 
otherwise. A 'stenographic transcript correct in 
every detail fails to reproduce tones of voice and 
hesitations of speech that often make a sentence 
mean the reverse of what the words signify. The 
best and most accurate record is like a dehydrated 
peach; it has neither the substance nor the flavor 
of the fruit before it was dried.' It resembles a 
pressed flower. The witness' demeanor, not ap-
parent in the record, may alone have 'impeached' 
him. * * *" 
Under the circumstances, the jury had available to 
them much that may have persuaded them of the defend-
ant's guilt. Their verdict was one reasonable under the 
circumstances, and the trial was free of prejudicial error. 
Therefore, the verdict must be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attornev General 
RONALD N BOYCE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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